Though Bush says there were no warnings of an attack, his administration received the following warnings Before 9-11

  • July 10, 2001 an urgent meeting between CIA Director George Tenet and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice warning of an impending al Qaeda attack.
  • 11 warnings from leaders of other nations and foreign intelligence apparatus' of terrorist threats
  • June 30, 2001 Senior Executive Intelligence Briefing (SEIB) entitled "bin Laden Threats Are Real"
  • The threat of President Bush's assassination at the G-8 Summit by al Qaeda in July of 2001 - using aircraft to dive bomb the summit building
  • July 2001 Phoenix memo, which told of potential terrorists taking flight lessons
  • 52 FAA warnings - five of which mentioned al Qaeda's training for hijacking
  • August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Brief entitled "bin Laden Determined to Strike in US"
  • National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)entitled "Islamist Extremists Learn to Fly"
  • Intelligence agency heads describing themselves with their "hair on fire" to characterize the imminent nature of the threats they were intercepting from Al Qaeda and their sense of urgency in relating them to the Bush Administration
  • The arrest of Zacharias Moussaoui in August of 2001
  • FBI Agent Harry Samit's 70 unsuccessful attempts to get a FISA Warrant to examine Moussaoui's belongings

Aside from scheduling a National Security Council meeting on September 4, 2001, two months after the July 10 "connect the dots" briefing from CIA director, George Tenet, the abundance of post 9/11 reports and commissions found no evidence of any action taken by appropriate officials.

The 9/11 Commission itself concluded that in spite of an unprecedented attack threat in the months before 9/11, US "domestic agencies never mobilized in response to the threat. They did not have direction, and did not have a plan to institute. The borders were not hardened. Transportation systems were not fortified.

Electronic surveillance was not targeted against a domestic threat. State and local law enforcement were not marshaled to augment the FBI's efforts. The public was not warned."

While certain members of the 9/11 Commission recalled a January 28, 2004 closed session meeting with former CIA Director, George Tenet, where this urgent July 10, 2001 meeting was discussed, this meeting was not referenced in the Commission's final report.

In the transcript testimony, the former CIA Director described the non-routine meeting that he and Cofer Black called for with then National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice as one of the "starkest warnings" ever given by the CIA to the White House on Al Qaeda.